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 HOW MUCH EVIDENCE IS ENOUGH? 





One of the most important issues for science in the courtroom is the 
determination of causality. Like science in the courtroom, science in the 
regulatory arena can also bring a clash of cultures, misunderstanding, and 
controversy—especially when decisions must be made with some urgency with 
interested parties watching closely. In this article I will discuss some 
conventions in the conduct of science and in the ways that scientific information 
is communicated to nonscientists that can make it difficult for judges, lawyers, 
regulators, and politicians to do their jobs making decisions about complex 
environmental and health issues. 
Of particular concern are the methods and conventions of causal inference 
as they are applied to controversies over whether chemicals and technologies 
are harming human health and the environment. There are far too many 
examples of environmental hazards that were permitted to be produced long 
after the evidence for harm was substantial.1 Political and economic forces are 
partly to blame for many of these cases, but scientific methods—particularly 
methods of causal inference—could be improved to make it easier for society to 
assess when evidence of a hazard is sufficient to take action. This article briefly 
describes some of the different conventions of causal inference in different 
scientific fields. As opposed to that in “pure” sciences, causal inference in 
environmental health sciences must necessarily include consideration of the 
social responsibility to act in the face of uncertainty, which has implications for 
the scientific process. A key component of environmental health sciences, 
distinct from many other science disciplines, is the management and 
communication of uncertainty. This article presents some examples of how this 
might improve the contributions of science to environmental health problems. 
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 1. See, e.g., EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENT AGENCY, LATE LESSONS FROM EARLY WARNINGS: THE 
PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 1896–2000 52, 64, 110 (2001) (documenting cases in which regulations 
lagged behind scientific evidence of harm posed by asbestos, lead, and polychlorinated biphenyls). 
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II 
SETTING THE CONTEXT—WHAT’S SPECIAL ABOUT ENVIRONMENTAL 
HEALTH SCIENCE? 
Most of the important environmental health crises share a fundamental 
characteristic: they appear to arise from disruptions of natural systems or cycles, 
whose behaviors are only partially understood.2 Global warming, endocrine 
disruption, ecologic and health risks from genetically modified organisms, 
environmental breast-cancer risks—these are all hazards about which a great 
deal of uncertainty remains. Martin Krayer von Krauss, a scholar of policy 
applications of science, characterizes the problems this way: 
There is not one problem, but a tangled web of related problems[:] . . . The dynamics 
of the systems studied are not necessarily regular, but are characterized by synergistic 
[or] antagonistic relationships [or both], indirect relationships, long delay periods 
between cause and effect, [and] thresholds, or non-linear behaviours[.] The issue lies 
across or at the intersection of many disciplines[.] . . . [I]t has economic, 
environmental, socio-cultural, and political dimensions . . . .3 
Because the human body, an ecosystem, a human society, or an economy 
are all complex dynamic systems, their behaviors are subject to fundamental 
uncertainties that will not be reduced no matter how long they are studied. This 
characteristic of complex systems sets them apart from many of the problems 
that western science has so successfully conquered. This inherent complexity is 
one defining feature of the terrain in which the environmental health sciences 
operate. 
A second defining feature is the urgency to act to prevent harm; the 
environmental health sciences look more like medicine in this regard than, say, 
astronomy or geology. Public-health scientists often do not have the luxury of 
waiting for further study to tie up the loose ends before the need to act. In other 
words, science conducted to inform policy on disease prevention and 
environmental protection is different from that of most conventional science in 
fundamental ways: facts are uncertain, social values are in dispute, the stakes 
are high, and decisions are urgent.4 
The central question of causality (Do greenhouse gases warm the planet? 
Does urban air-pollution kill people?) is often a stumbling block when 
“traditional” scientific perspectives are applied to problems like these because 
of the mistaken belief that there is a single truth that science can, with enough 
resources, identify. Although there may in principle be such a truth, in public 
health we recognize a duty to act when we are far from that truth. 
 
 2. See BARRY COMMONER, THE CLOSING CIRCLE: NATURE, MAN, AND TECHNOLOGY 293–300 
(1971) (describing the complexity of relationships between social and environmental problems). 
 3. Martin Krayer von Krauss, Uncertainty in Policy Relevant Sciences 5 (Dec. 2005) (unpublished 
Ph.D. dissertation, Danish Technical University), available at http://orbit.dtu.dk/getResource?recordId 
=186518&objectId=1&versionId=1 (last visited Sept. 28, 2008) (bullets omitted). 
 4. See SILVIO O. FUNTOWICZ & JEROME R. RAVETZ, UNCERTAINTY AND QUALITY IN SCIENCE 
FOR POLICY 7–16 (1990) (explaining the importance of quality assurance in policy-related research). 
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III 
LATE LESSONS FROM EARLY WARNINGS 
There are too many examples of environmental hazards that have been 
allowed to be produced and used long after there was evidence of their 
hazardousness. Sadly, many of the most toxic chemicals introduced into 
widespread use in the early twentieth century are still causing illness and death 
despite overwhelming evidence of their effects: benzene, asbestos, and lead are 
three prime examples. It has been well documented that economic interests 
played a major role in blocking actions to control these hazards, and some 
effective voices have spoken out about this perversion of public health.5 David 
Michaels and his colleagues have documented repeatedly how the 
manufacturing of uncertainty has been one of the principal tools of industries 
wanting to slow or prevent regulation of hazardous products.6 
But these tragic histories of failure to act to prevent disease and pollution 
teach another important lesson: neither scientists nor policymakers are clear 
about how and when to determine that scientific evidence of risk is sufficient to 
provoke preventive actions. When there is uncertainty about the evidence for 
harm (and in complex systems, there always is), it creates the hesitation and 
confusion into which economic forces find it rather easy to insert their own 
interests. Thus, the two problems are linked and both are essential to resolve: 
corruption of science and poor understanding of how to proceed from scientific 
evidence to causal conclusion. 
One can see the intertwining of these phenomena again and again in an 
outstanding report published by the European Environment Agency.7 The 
report presents a series of case studies of environmental hazards documenting 
how evidence of hazardousness accumulated and at what points along the way 
causal judgments were made by relevant government and scientific 
organizations.8 The report describes how lack of “sufficient” evidence of harm 
was misinterpreted as evidence of safety in fourteen different cases—including 
asbestos, lead, and polychlorinated biphenyls.9 
How should uncertainty be managed? How can uncertain evidence be 
communicated to the public and policymakers in a useful way? How can less-
 
 5. See, e.g., SHELDON KRIMSKY, SCIENCE IN THE PRIVATE INTEREST: HAS THE LURE OF 
PROFITS CORRUPTED BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH? (2003) (examining the influence of corporate 
interests on public-health research); David Michaels, Scientific Evidence and Public Policy, 95 AM. J. 
PUB. HEALTH (SUPPLEMENT 1) S5 (2005) (explaining how judicial standards for measuring scientific 
validity can delay protective measures for public health); David Michaels et al., Advice Without Dissent, 
SCIENCE, Oct. 25, 2002, at 703 (arguing that special interests unduly influenced the selection of 
scientific advisory committees under President George W. Bush). 
 6. See Michaels, supra note 5, at S6 (explaining how the tobacco industry resisted regulation by 
challenging the validity of scientific data); Michaels et al., supra note 5, at 703 (predicting that 
ideologically unbalanced advisory committees would “emphasize the uncertainties of health and 
environmental risks, supporting the administration’s antiregulatory views.”). 
 7. EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENT AGENCY, supra note 1. 
 8. Id. at 192. 
 9. Id. at 52, 64, 110. 
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than-perfect evidence lead to appropriate policy responses? These are the 
topics this article will address. 
IV 
THE RULES OF CAUSAL INFERENCE WERE NOT HANDED DOWN ON STONE 
TABLETS 
Scientists do not follow a single overarching “scientific method.”10 There are 
a small number of defining principles of science, but these are hardly a 
prescription for daily work. Nearly all scientists will agree that their work 
consists of formulating and testing hypotheses by applying logical reasoning and 
gathering evidence in a repeatable manner. But beyond these essential steps, a 
tremendous diversity in method and convention occurs. Indeed, different 
communities of scientists are defined by their methods—the tools they use to 
understand the world—as much as by the particular piece of the world they 
choose to study.11 This is understandable given the lengthy training and practice 
that is generally needed to become adept at a sophisticated method like 
chemical analysis, gene sequencing, or climate modeling. Often, developing new 
methods or even combining existing ones requires a willingness to reach across 
disciplinary boundaries, learning the language and perspectives of other 
researchers. These cross-border excursions are notoriously difficult to carry out, 
and while interdisciplinarity is often proclaimed to be a laudable goal, there are 
many structural reasons why it remains exceptional. 
One particular aspect of the scientific methods merits focus: the ways in 
which conclusions are drawn from observations, or how one decides if a 
hypothesized causal pattern is sufficiently supported by data to be accepted as 
real. For some scientists, the ability to make accurate predictions from a theory 
is seen as the critical confirmatory evidence (in physics, for example). But in 
observational fields (for example, epidemiology), this step is impractical or 
useless, and instead much weight is given to the accumulation of observations 
that appear to be coherent. When studying chronic disease, or climate change, it 
may be impractical or unethical to wait around to see if predictions are borne 
out as a way to confirm a theory. In some disciplines (for example, molecular 
biology), controlled experiments are essential, while this is rarely so in 
environmental sciences, in which the most informative experiments cannot be 
conducted for logistical or ethical reasons (there is only one atmosphere to 
 
 10. See Jerome R. Ravetz, Essay, Conventions in Science and in the Courts: Images and Realities, 72 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 25 (Winter 2009). 
 11. For example, the scientists in the fields of surgical oncology, cancer biology, and cancer 
epidemiology all are concerned with the same disease, but in their daily work, the design of their 
research strategies and even much of their technical language, these researchers work in very different 
fields. The surgeon treats an individual human being, the biologist often works with cells in culture, and 
the epidemiologist uses statistics to detect patterns in population data. These differences are like 
cultural barriers which can be crossed, but with difficulty. 
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study; potential reproductive toxins cannot be administered to humans in 
double-blind trials). 
The types of evidence used in arriving at a judgment that a particular 
chemical is a human carcinogen illustrate the complexity of the causal-inference 
process in environmental health science. Data on the geographic distributions 
of cancers may suggest a natural component of soil (as in the case of some 
asbestiform minerals that cause mesothelioma) or the emissions from a factory. 
Time trends in cancer frequency may be correlated with trends in consumption 
of a product (as in tobacco and lung cancer). The occurrence of cancers in 
highly exposed working populations is often viewed as carrying considerable 
inferential weight. Animal experiments have an essential role, but one that is 
limited by the problem of cross-species extrapolation. Finally, experimental 
knowledge of chemical pathways of cancer induction and predictions about 
chemical structures and their likely biologic activity can also be considered. Any 
one of these lines of argument is imperfect, and none is either necessary or 
sufficient. It is the accumulated preponderance of evidence that is assessed to 
reach a causal judgment. 
Within the accepted practices of science is a very wide range of “rules of 
evidence” and, in particular, beliefs about how much and what kinds of 
evidence are necessary to reach a causal judgment. Two brief detours into very 
different fields of science may help to make the point. 
A. Cause in Physical Anthropology and Paleobiology 
In the fields of physical anthropology and paleobiology, it seems that 
Darwin’s methods, and not just his conclusions, continue to loom large in the 
study of ancient life. The evaluation of causal hypotheses in paleobiology, 
following Darwin, gives considerable weight to “consili[e]nce of induction” and 
“identification of unique and quirky artifacts of history.”12 More recently, 
investigators also invoke the importance of the consistency of arguments and 
successful predictions from mathematical models.13 
Consilience of induction was the method used by Darwin in marshalling the 
evidence for the theory of evolution.14 The term means simply the converging of 
diverse lines of evidence, all of which are best explained by a single “cause.” So, 
in Darwin’s case, he argued for evolution using comparative anatomy, the fossil 
 
 12. Paul J. Morris, Testing Patterns and Causes of Faunal Stability in the Fossil Record, with an 
Example from the Pliocene Lusso Beds of Zaire, PALAEOGEOGRAPHY, PALAEOCLIMATOLOGY, 
PALAEOECOLOGY, Dec. 20, 1996, at 313, 319 (citing CHARLES DARWIN, ON THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES 
BY MEANS OF NATURAL SELECTION (Harvard Univ. Press 1964) (1859); CHARLES DARWIN, THE 
VARIOUS CONTRIVANCES BY WHICH ORCHIDS ARE FERTILISED BY INSECTS (Chicago Univ. Press 
1984) (1877)). 
 13. Morris, supra note 12, at 319. 
 14. The method was first proposed by William Whewell. See 2 WILLIAM WHEWELL, THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF THE INDUCTIVE SCIENCES, FOUNDED UPON THEIR HISTORY 74 (1847) (“The 
Consiliences of our Inductions give rise to a constant Convergence of our Theory towards Simplicity 
and Unity.”). 
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record, evidence from animal- and plant-breeding experiments, and other 
observations. 
When nonexperts read of developments in physical anthropology, it often 
seems to them presumptuous when someone concludes, for example, that a new 
hominid species has been identified—seemingly on the basis of examination of 
a single, often quite incomplete skeleton and comparison of it to the bones of a 
handful of other individual skeletons in museums. From inside these debates, it 
may be clear that quite a number of different types of evidence have been 
marshaled, and that the weight given to the single skeleton is quite appropriate. 
Of course, peers may disagree with the conclusions, and often question the 
adequacy of the evidence. But there is no chance that these critics will demand 
experimental evidence or statistical power calculations when judging the quality 
of the research! 
B. Cause in Molecular Biology 
The second example is another life science, but one that is about as different 
as possible in the ways that causal inference is conducted. Molecular biology has 
achieved profound insights into the chemical and cellular machinery of life. It is 
largely a laboratory science that benefits from the power of experimental 
methods. Perhaps because of this ability to experiment while unraveling life’s 
mysteries, molecular biology has been held up as a paragon of the power of 
rigorous and systematic investigation.15 
The title of John Platt’s 1964 article said it all: Strong Inference—Certain 
Systematic Methods of Scientific Thinking May Produce Much More Rapid 
Progress than Others.16 Molecular biology was Platt’s star example of rapid 
progress. This widely cited work argued for the importance in all scientific work 
of an approach that is essentially Francis Bacon’s inductive inference, “familiar 
to every college student.”17 According to Platt, the essential elements are “(1) 
[d]evising alternative hypotheses; (2) [d]evising a crucial experiment . . . with 
alternative possible outcomes, each of which will, as nearly as possible, exclude 
one or more of the hypotheses; [and] (3) [c]arrying out the experiment so as to 
get a clean result.”18 In subsequent steps, new “subhypotheses” refine the 
conclusions from the first experiment. Platt argued that molecular biology was 
already (in 1964) showing such rapid progress because its practitioners followed 
this method, while other fields did not.19 
Although Platt’s Strong Inference has limited application in observational 
sciences like much of public health, the article remains valuable for its 
insistence on careful formulation of hypotheses and a preference for logical 
 
 15. See John R. Platt, Strong Inference, SCIENCE, Oct. 16, 1964, at 347, 348 (explaining that the 
structure and reporting of experiments in molecular biology is systematically inferential). 
 16. Id. at 347. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. at 348. 
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thought over mindless data gathering. The fact that it is frequently cited, 
particularly in molecular biology, indicates that researchers in this field do 
aspire to Platt’s pure inductive inference—an approach that is very different 
from most environmental health sciences and different as well from 
paleobiology. Of course no one field of science is superior in its causal 
judgments to another; what should be clear, though, is that these rules of 
evidence are shaped by the tools and evidence that are available—by 
pragmatism and tradition. 
Considering how diverse the accepted procedures are for weighing evidence 
and drawing conclusions among the sciences, scientists in environmental health 
science have license to consider which procedures are most appropriate in this 
particular field. This is especially important for applied sciences whose purpose 
is not simply to understand the world better (to puzzle out the human family 
tree, for example), but to inform policy decisions. 
V 
BRADFORD HILL AND THE NECESSITY OF ACTING UNDER UNCERTAINTY 
At nearly the same time that John Platt was promoting strong inference, Sir 
Austin Bradford Hill was laying out a very different set of principles for causal 
inference in epidemiology.20 Bradford Hill and his colleague Sir Richard Doll 
are probably the best known epidemiologists of the twentieth century. Bradford 
Hill proposed a set of considerations, sometimes incorrectly called criteria, by 
which one could arrive at a causal judgment about an environmental risk, such 
as smoking and lung cancer. 
According to Bradford Hill, these nine considerations should be weighed 
when evaluating the causality of a particular exposure–disease association.21 
Five of these are most frequently cited: 
1. Strength of association—the risk of disease should be substantially higher in an 
exposed group than an unexposed one; 
2. There should be a “biological gradient”—evidence that those with higher exposure 
are at even higher risk than those at low or moderate exposure; 
3. Consistency—repeated studies of the same association should find the same result; 
4. Plausibility—there should be experimental evidence or a mechanistic understanding 
of how the exposure could conceivably cause disease; and 
5. Temporality—there should be evidence that the cause preceded the effect.22 
Bradford Hill was adamant that these considerations were not a checklist, 
nor were some more or less important than others: “What I do not believe . . . is 
 
 20. Austin Bradford Hill, The Environment and Disease: Association or Causation?, 58 PROC. 
ROYAL SOC’Y MED. 295 (1965). 
 21. Id. at 295–99. 
 22. Id. 
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that we can usefully lay down some hard-and-fast rules of evidence that must be 
obeyed before we accept cause and effect.”23 
The process of causal inference that Bradford Hill laid out in 1965 is very 
different from Platt’s, for two fundamental reasons. First, when seeking the 
environmental causes of disease, one cannot often conduct experiments nor 
control precisely for extraneous factors that might explain patterns of disease 
that would otherwise appear to indict a particular hazard. Second, epidemiology 
is one of the fundamental sciences of public health and its practitioners have 
social responsibilities to inform actions that could prevent disease. And while 
Bradford Hill concerned himself narrowly with epidemiology, these same two 
challenges apply as well to other environmental health sciences including 
climate science, wildlife conservation, and public health. On the need for action, 
Bradford Hill was quite clear: 
All scientific work is incomplete—whether it be observational or experimental. All 
scientific work is liable to be upset or modified by advancing knowledge. That does 
not confer upon us a freedom to ignore the knowledge we already have, or to 
postpone the action that it appears to demand at a given time.24 
The amount of evidence that is sufficient to lead to preventive action is 
variable, and not a purely scientific consideration. A great deal of ink has been 
spilled in the forty-two years since Bradford Hill’s famous article—debating 
whether his methods can be improved, whether his list of “criteria” is complete, 
or whether something closer to inductive inference should replace his 
perspective.25 But most of these debates have missed an important point: The 
crucial question for public health is not, Is there enough evidence to decide that 
X causes Y? but, Is there enough evidence to act as if X causes Y, given relevant 
contextual factors A, B, and C? The answer to the second question clearly 
depends on the consequences of deciding yes or no, and it depends on the risks 
of being wrong. Thus, the debate is not an entirely scientific one, as the 
judgment of “how much evidence is enough” has social dimensions, and will 
depend on political and cultural concerns—such as whether acceptable and 
affordable alternatives can achieve the same social good—and on the 
consequences of inaction or acting in error. 
An example from the environmental sciences may help make the general 
point: Whether a particular fishery is so threatened that all fishing should be 
stopped might seem to be a purely scientific question with a single, objective 
answer. However, the evidence on which such a determination is made is 
usually inadequate, so the conclusion is uncertain. In the face of this 
uncertainty, a society might decide to weigh the impacts on fishing communities 
of the alternative policy options—thus interjecting social-political 
 
 23. Id. at 299. 
 24. Id. at 300. 
 25. See generally CAUSAL INFERENCE (Kenneth J. Rothman & Stephan F. Lanes eds., 1988); 
David Ozonoff, Epistemology in the Courtroom: A Little “Knowledge” Is a Dangerous Thing, 95 AM. J. 
PUB. HEALTH (SUPPLEMENT 1) S13 (2005); Kenneth J. Rothman & Sander Greenland, Causation and 
Causal Inference in Epidemiology, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH (SUPPLEMENT 1) S144 (2005). 
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considerations. “But this is not science!” some will protest; and they are correct. 
There may or may not be a single, true answer to the question, but in the real 
world, there will always be many uncertainties in the science. And in the gray 
area generated by the substantial uncertainties, it is realistic to expect other 
“nonscientific” issues to enter the debate. In other words, whereas the scientific 
research can tell us something about the costs, risks, and benefits of a proposed 
action, in the end there will have to be value judgments embedded in political 
decisions. Some would argue that the science should be kept entirely separate 
from these value judgments, but this is unrealistic because the scientific data 
used for making policy will nearly always be limited by uncertainty. Managing 
and communicating this uncertainty should be a responsibility of the scientists, 
but it cannot be separated entirely from the policy debates that it is meant to 
inform. 
The precautionary principle has been a useful way to focus attention on the 
particular challenges of taking actions in the face of scientific uncertainty.26 The 
definition of the precautionary principle developed for the Rio Declaration of 
198927 is often cited, and the 1998 Wingspread Statement28 contains similar 
language: “When an activity raises threats of harm to human health or the 
environment, precautionary measures should be taken even if some cause and 
effect relationships are not fully established scientifically.”29 
The term “precautionary principle” was introduced into English as a 
translation of the German word Vorsorgeprinzip.30 An alternative translation 
might have been “foresight principle,” which connotes more positive, 
anticipatory action, rather than precaution, which to many sounds negative.31 
The Wingspread Statement involves four central components of the principle: 
1. taking preventive action in the face of uncertainty, 
2. shifting the burden of proof to the proponents of an activity, 
3. exploring a wide range of alternatives to possibly harmful actions, and 
4. increasing public participation in decisionmaking.32 
 
 26. See, e.g., David Kriebel & Joel Tickner, Re-energizing Public Health Through Precaution, 91 
AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1351 (2001) (“[T]he precautionary principle . . . promotes the search for safer 
technologies, encourages greater democracy and openness in public health policy, and stimulates 
reevaluation of the methods of public health science.”); David Kriebel et al., The Precautionary 
Principle in Environmental Science, 109 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 871 (2001) (explaining how 
environmental science can best protect human health and the environment by applying the 
precautionary principle). 
 27. See Conference on Environment and Development, June 3–14, 1992, Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development, ¶ 15, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (Aug. 12, 1992). 
 28. Science & Environmental Health Network, Wingspread Conference on the Precautionary 
Principle, Jan. 23–25, 1998, Wingspread Statement on the Precautionary Principle, para. 5, available at 
http://www.sehn.org/state.html#w [hereinafter Wingspread Statement]. 
 29. See also PROTECTING PUBLIC HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT: IMPLEMENTING THE 
PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 8 (Carolyn Raffensperger & Joel Tickner eds., 1999). 
 30. Kriebel & Tickner, supra note 26, at 1351. 
 31. Id. 
 32. See Raffensperger & Tickner, supra note 29, at 8–9 (condensing the text of the statement into 
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The precautionary principle can be useful in debates at the science–policy 
interface because it encourages consideration of the public (and broader 
environmental) good when decisions must be made under scientific uncertainty. 
When there is uncertainty about the risks and benefits of a proposed activity, 
the precautionary view is that decisions should be made in a way that errs on 
the side of caution with respect to the environment and the health of the public. 
But precaution is only a useful insight—it does not resolve the central problem 
of how to determine how much evidence is needed to take a certain action in a 
certain context. 
Some examples of specific problems may help to illustrate the point: 
1. The U.K. National Radiological Protection Board has advised “a 
precautionary approach to the use of mobile phone technologies,” especially by 
children.33 “There is no hard evidence at present that the health of the public, in 
general, is being affected adversely by the use of mobile phone technologies,” 
the Health Protection Agency said in a press release accompanying the report, 
“but uncertainties remain and a continued precautionary approach to their use 
is recommended until the situation is further clarified.”34 In other words, they 
said there was enough evidence of risk only to recommend a cautious policy for 
a presumably vulnerable group, but not to make a flat assertion that there is a 
risk. This runs counter to the “risk-based approach” that is commonly taken in 
U.S. policy, whereby the first step in any policy decision is to assess the risk and 
decide whether or not it is “acceptable.”35 
2. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) does not permit the use of 
cellular telephones during “critical phases” of commercial airline flights.36 This 
is based on concerns that the use of radio frequency transmitting devices may 
interfere with navigation or communication equipment.37 This evidence is 
almost entirely anecdotal,38 but despite this lack of experimental evidence, the 
 
these four points). 
 33. NAT’L RADIOLOGICAL PROT. BD., MOBILE PHONES AND HEALTH 2004: REPORT BY THE 
BOARD OF NRPB 7 (2004) (U.K.), available at http://www.hpa.org.uk/web/HPAwebFile/HPAweb 
_C/1194947333240. 
 34. Press Release, Health Protection Agency, Mobile Phones and Health (Jan. 11, 2005) (U.K.), 
available at http://www.hpa.org.uk/webw/HPAweb&HPAwebStandard/HPAweb_C/1195733730486?p= 
1158945066117. 
 35. See, e.g., EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENT AGENCY, supra note 1, at 181 (noting the danger of 
“paralysis by analysis,” when risk assessment procedures delay action to protect public health); John C. 
Bailar III & A. John Bailer, Risk AssessmentThe Mother of All Uncertainties: Disciplinary 
Perspectives on Uncertainty in Risk Assessment, 895 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 273, 285 (explaining that 
“[r]isk assessment is a process of analysis, not a specific kind of research and not a result, and it must be 
viewed as a process that is subject to much uncertainty”). 
 36. Advisory Circular No. 91-21.1B, Federal Aviation Administration, Use of Portable Electronic 
Devices Aboard Aircraft 1 (Aug. 25, 2006), available at http://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_ 
Library/rgAdvisoryCircular.nsf/0/b5c85ae8e38df676862571da00529da4/$FILE/AC%2091.21-1B.pdf. 
 37. Id at 3–4. 
 38. Portable Electronic Devices: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Aviation of the Committee on 
Transportation and Infrastructure, 106th Cong. 28 (2000) (statement of Paul McCarthy, Executive Air 
Safety Chairman, Air Line Pilots Association, explaining that “[a]lthough such reports might not be 
scientifically repeatable they are proof enough for the pilots that these devices should not be used 
07_KRIEBEL__CONTRACT PROOF_.DOC 4/2/2009 11:13:58 AM 
Winter 2009] HOW MUCH EVIDENCE IS ENOUGH?  131 
FAA holds that the catastrophic nature of the risk justifies a precautionary 
stance and that the onus is on the air carriers to show that use is not hazardous.39 
This example illustrates how the weight of evidence needed to make a policy 
decision depends on the consequences of being wrong. 
3. Certain phthalate plasticizers have been removed from children’s toys 
because of the possibility they may be harmful if ingested.40 These chemicals are 
still permitted in many other products, including medical devices, because the 
manufacturers argue that risks are small and no good alternatives exist.41 Thus, 
the lack of a clear social benefit for using these plasticizers in children’s toys 
shifts the amount of evidence needed for its ban to less than it might be if its use 
were clearly indispensable. 
In each of these cases, the chosen action would be easier to understand, 
question, and even revise if there were better methods of summarizing the 
weight of evidence and the amounts and types of uncertainties that researchers 
identify. 
VI 
MANAGING AND COMMUNICATING UNCERTAINTY 
Managing and communicating uncertainty are not topics covered by John 
Platt in Strong Inference, while Austin Bradford Hill did address them (albeit in 
different terms) in his article on causal inference.42 We are slowly learning that, 
in fields like environmental health science, it can be just as important to say 
what we don’t know as what we do (or think we do) know. The eminent 
Australian scientist Ian Lowe said it well: “We have to start by recognizing that 
our understanding of nature–society interactions is still limited. . . . [M]odern 
science could still be described as islands of understanding in oceans of 
ignorance. We are constantly engaged in land reclamation, but there is no 
chance of filling in the oceans.”43 
At present, there is only a limited form of evaluation of error or uncertainty 
in the large majority of environmental health science research articles. Random 
error resulting from sampling is always evaluated using the familiar—but widely 
misunderstood—concept of statistical significance. Beyond this, there may be a 
 
during critical phases of flight”). 
 39. Matthew Brelis, Despite Study, Ban Holds on In-Flight Cell Phone Use, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 
6, 1999, at D2 (quoting FAA spokeswoman Kathryn Creedy’s explanation that “[r]egulations require 
airlines to prove to us that anything brought on board is not harmful to the system. If data is submitted, 
we will take a look at it and then make a judgment.”). 
 40. See Katherine M. Shea, Pediatric Exposure and Potential Toxicity of Phthalate Plasticizers, 111 
PEDIATRICS 1467, 1468 (2003) (noting “the removal of all phthalates from infant bottle nipples, 
pacifiers, teethers, and infant toys”). 
 41. Id. at 1468, 1472. 
 42. Compare Platt, supra note 15, with Hill, supra note 20, at 300. 
 43. Interview by Robyn Williams with Ian Lowe, on Ockham’s Razor: Sustainability Science 
(Radio National broadcast June 24, 2001), available at http://www.abc.net.au/rn/science/ockham/stories 
/s317194.htm. 
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qualitative examination of limitations of the findings, which is usually left to the 
Discussion section at the end of the article. Statistical significance, evaluated 
using p-values and confidence intervals, addresses only the magnitude of 
potential error in the statistical parameter estimates due strictly to sampling 
variability. But in observational studies of complex, poorly understood systems, 
this may be the least important source of uncertainty. Potentially more 
important are errors in the independent variables, errors arising from choice of 
the wrong form for the model(s) used to analyze and interpret the data, and 
biases from problems in the conduct of the study. 
For example, a study of the effects of an environmental contaminant on 
sexual differentiation in fish would typically report the amount of sampling 
error around the final estimate of the degree of association found between the 
contaminant and several different measures of sexual development. But this 
would typically not take into consideration the error in measuring the levels of 
the contaminant in the fish or in the environment, and would not investigate the 
sensitivity of the findings to the choice of statistical models used to link 
exposure with reproductive outcome. 
Explicitly addressing uncertainty is an important contribution of research 
because it clarifies what is known and unknown and thus stimulates further 
investigation. But there is also a strong desire on the part of scientists to be 
precise. This may result from a confusion of uncertainty of information with 
quality of information, but the two concepts are distinct.44 Quality has been 
described as “the totality of characteristics of an object that bear on its ability to 
satisfy an established need.”45 Uncertainty (or lack of it) contributes to quality 
of information, but while uncertainty is a feature of the information itself, the 
information quality depends on its use and context. One can find many 
examples of highly uncertain information that is still of adequate quality. 
In order to feel more comfortable with uncertain evidence, policymakers 
must accept that absolute certainty is not obtainable. But when they look to 
scientists for answers, both policymakers and the courts may still retain a deep 
hope or faith that there is a single truth or certainty that science can provide. 
The myth of certainty is convenient for scientists, too. Environmental research 
involves many assumptions, choices, and inferences based on professional 
judgment and standard practices. These should be made explicitly (and a 
priori), but in practice this is very hard to do completely. The many hidden 
assumptions make results appear more certain and less value-laden than they 
really are. 
Scientists can do more to emphasize how little we know about 
environmental risks instead of only emphasizing what we do know. This leads to 
two desirable outcomes: recognition of the need for more and smarter research 
programs on environmental hazards, and removal of a major prop from the 
 
 44. FUNTOWICZ & RAVETZ, supra note 4, at 29 (noting that “information of low certainty may yet 
be of high quality for its function”). 
 45. Krayer von Krauss, supra note 3, at 18. 
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myth that science can give clear and certain answers about environmental 
hazards. 
VII 
SOME WAYS FORWARD 
Old ideas give way slowly; for they are more than abstract logical forms and 
categories. They are habits, predispositions, deeply engrained attitudes of aversion 
and preference. Moreover, the conviction persists—though history shows it to be a 
hallucination—that all the questions that the human mind has asked are questions that 
can be answered in terms of the alternatives that the questions themselves present. 
But in fact intellectual progress usually occurs through sheer abandonment of 
questions . . . We do not solve them: we get over them. Old questions are solved by 
disappearing, evaporating, while new questions corresponding to the changed attitude 
of endeavor and preference take their place. 
John Dewey (1859–1952)46 
“Standard practice” in science is not fixed but responds to new 
measurement tools, new ways of framing old problems, outside pressures, fads, 
and fashions—all within the bounds of what the scientific community will 
largely agree are acceptable methods. Environmental health scientists can still 
learn better ways to manage and communicate uncertainty and more effectively 
participate in deciding when the evidence is sufficient to act to protect health or 
environment. 
For example, at least two systems are available for formally assessing and 
presenting the full(er) range of uncertainties (and therefore the level of 
confidence) in a scientific datum. These have not yet been used in many specific 
applications, but several research groups are currently promoting them. 
Funtowicz and Ravetz have proposed one of these systems, called NUSAP 
(after the first letters of each of the five components), for communicating 
uncertainty in quantitative information through standard scales or descriptors.47 
The idea is to provide the public and policymakers with a compact set of codes 
that are attached to a policy-relevant bit of data, which indicate how the 
scientists who have developed the datum think it should be weighed when 
making decisions. One of the leading proponents of this system describes 
NUSAP as a “Patient Information Leaflet” containing essential warnings, 
limitations, and potential pitfalls if the information is to be used in setting 
policy.48 The five components of NUSAP are as follows: 
1. Numeral: the actual bit of data. 
2. Unit: the unit of measure, but also containing contextual information like the period 
of time or type of people [or] place to which the information applies. 
 
 46. JOHN DEWEY, The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy, in THE INFLUENCE OF DARWIN ON 
PHILOSOPHY, AND OTHER ESSAYS IN CONTEMPORARY THOUGHT 1, 19 (1910). 
 47. FUNTOWICZ & RAVETZ, supra note 4, at 28. 
 48. Jeroen P. van der Sluijs, Uncertainty and Precaution in Environmental Management: Insights 
from the UPEM Conference, 22 ENVTL. MODELLING & SOFTWARE 590, 596 (2007). 
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3. Spread: a range of plausible or expected results—confidence or credibility limits, for 
example. 
4. Assessment: a qualitative judgment of the researcher about the importance of the 
number—such things as its “significance” or if it represents an “optimistic” or 
“pessimistic” estimate. 
5. Pedigree: a descriptor of how the information was obtained—was this an educated 
guess, the result of a single study, or the output of an exhaustive systematic review of 
many studies?49 
The first three of these are not very different from the way that scientific 
data are typically presented, whereas the last two introduce important and 
difficult new concepts designed to help users understand how much weight to 
give to a piece of scientific information. 
The fourth component, assessment, is what many people think statistical 
significance does. The limitations of statistical significance and the chronic 
misuse of the concept have been well covered.50 But, even though statistical 
significance is widely misunderstood and misused, one reason it has been so 
hard to dissuade researchers from using it is that it seems to fulfill an important 
function of “quality” assessment—to distinguish between what is real and what 
is not. As the literal meaning suggests, it would be useful to know if a datum is 
“significant” or not. The p-value does not actually provide this information, but 
the desire to have it is not wrong. Thus, one can understand the NUSAP 
assessment component as a separate bit of data attached to the main datum and 
attesting to the quality of the latter. 
Another way to organize and present information on the uncertainty in 
scientific information used for policymaking identifies three essential 
dimensions of uncertainty: location, level, and nature.51 A matrix can be 
constructed for each policy-relevant piece of information that presents a 
systematic summary of the associated uncertainties, indicating where in the 
methods or models the uncertainty occurs (location); how severe the 
uncertainty is—perhaps using a verbal descriptor or semiquantitative scales 
(level); and whether the uncertainty is due to imperfections in our knowledge 
and therefore theoretically reducible, or on the contrary due to inherent 
variability in natural phenomena and not reducible (nature).52 
 
 49. FUNTOWICZ & RAVETZ, supra note 4, at 28–29. 
 50. See, e.g., Douglas G. Altman & J. Martin Bland, Absence of Evidence Is Not Evidence of 
Absence, 311 BRIT. MED. J. 485, 485 (1995) (observing that “non-equivalence of statistical significance 
and clinical importance has long been recognised, but this error of interpretation remains common”); 
Stephen N. Goodman, Toward Evidence-Based Medical Statistics. 1: The P Value Fallacy, 130 ANNALS 
INTERNAL MED. 995, 995 (1999) (noting that “the methods of statistical inference in current use are not 
‘evidence-based’ and thus have contributed to a widespread misperception”); Kenneth J. Rothman, 
Significance Questing, 105 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 445, 445 (1986) (explaining that “[w]ith the focus 
on statistical significance, if chance seems to be a plausible explanation, then other theories are too 
readily discarded, regardless of how tenable they may be”). 
 51. Walker et al., Defining Uncertainty: A Conceptual Basis for Uncertainty Management in Model-
Based Decision Support, INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT, Mar. 1, 2003, at 5, 8. 
 52. Id. at 9–14. 
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These systems are as yet in only limited use, and much more work needs to 
be done before scientists will feel comfortable with any formal codification of 
uncertainty. Yet we must move in this direction. 
In the meantime, there are a number of less comprehensive yet better-
accepted ways for researchers to explore and communicate aspects of 
uncertainty. Bayesian statistics provides one such partial solution. The Bayesian 
view of statistical inference starts from accepting that we have beliefs about the 
phenomena under study, and it seeks to formalize the role these play in the way 
we view information.53 Bayesian statistical methods correspond more closely to 
everyday understanding of logical inference and have the potential to allow 
more-transparent communication of the confidence that an investigator has in 
data. Methods-development work is still needed in most fields, however, before 
Bayesian statistics can be routinely applied. Another practice that is slowly 
gaining ground is sensitivity analysis, in which investigators assess the degree to 
which the main results are changed by using different assumptions or analytic 
methods.54 Sensitivity analyses should probably become standard in every 
policy-relevant research article. 
VIII 
CONCLUSION 
Whether cause exists is a judgment—the result of an inferential process. The 
important policy question is when do we have enough information to act as if it 
is a cause, while being prepared to be wrong? Framing causal inference as a 
purely scientific problem is inappropriate in fields like public health, where 
there is a duty to act. Instead, we have to ask, When do we have enough 
information to act as if something is a cause? And the answer is very context 
dependent. It depends on what the alternatives are and on the risks of being 
wrong. These are not fundamentally scientific considerations, although science 
can assist. 
This is one of the crucial ways in which scientific research and policymaking 
are linked. Scientists, while maintaining objectivity as much as possible and 
remaining mindful not to undermine the legitimacy that society grants them as 
purveyors of valuable information, must nevertheless engage with the public 
and policymakers if they are to uphold their social responsibility. We are 
currently witnessing an extremely important and unprecedented example of this 
responsible social engagement from the scientists of the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change. They have managed to communicate an important 
yet complex message: Much more needs to be learned about climate, and we 
 
 53. See BRADLEY P. CARLIN & THOMAS A. LOUIS, BAYES AND EMPIRICAL BAYES METHODS 
FOR DATA ANALYSIS 6 (1996) (“Bayesian formalism encourages documentation of assumptions.”). 
 54. See Sander Greenland, Basic Methods for Sensitivity Analysis of Biases, 25 INT’L J. 
EPIDEMIOLOGY 1107, 1115 (1996) (explaining the need to address systematic bias and reviewing the 
basic methods of bias assessment). 
07_KRIEBEL__CONTRACT PROOF_.DOC 4/2/2009 11:13:58 AM 
136 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 72:121 
know enough that we cannot remain silent about the need for action.55 These 
scientists have stepped out of their roles as data gatherers and analysts and have 
spoken publicly about the need for action. Researchers in other environmental 
health fields should follow their lead. 
 
 
 55. See, e.g., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: 
SYNTHESIS REPORT 58 (2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr.pdf 
(“Both bottom-up and top-down studies indicate that there is high agreement and much evidence of 
substantial economic potential for the mitigation of global GHG emissions over the coming decades 
that could offset the projected growth of global emissions or reduce emissions below current levels.”). 
